What’s in (a) Label? Neural Origins and Behavioral Manifestations of Identity Avoidance in Language and Cognition by Leivada, Evelina
What’s in (a) Label? Neural Origins and
Behavioral Manifestations of Identity Avoidance
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Evelina Leivada
The present work defends the idea that grammatical categories are not in-
trinsic to mergeable items, taking as a departure point Lenneberg’s (1967,
1975) claim that syntactic objects are definable only contextually. It is ar-
gued that there are four different strands of inquiry that are of interest
when one seeks to build an evolutionarily plausible theory of labels and
operation Label: (i) linguistic constraints on adjacent elements of the same
type such as Repetition/Identity Avoidance ([*XX]), (ii) data that flout
these constraints ([XX]), (iii) disorders that raise questions as to whether
the locus of impairment is a categorial feature per se, and (iv) operation
Label as a candidate for human uniqueness. After discussing categorial
identity through these perspectives, this work first traces the origins and
manifestations of Identity Avoidance in language and other domains of hu-
man cognition, with emphasis on attention orienting. Second, it proposes
a new processing principle, the Novel Information Bias, that (i) captures
linguistic Identity Avoidance based on how the brain decodes types and
tokens and (ii) explains the universal fact that generally the existence of
adjacent occurrences of syntactically and/or phonologically identical to-
kens is severely constrained.
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1. Introduction
Over the last five decades, linguists have observed a very interesting phenomenon:
Elements of the same type are unlikely to occur in immediately adjacent positions;
instead, they are usually mediated by other elements. This observation has been
described in different, yet similar ways, in the linguistics literature: Obligatory
Contour Principle (OCP; Odden 1986, Yip 1988), Identity Restrictions/Avoidance
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(Berent et al. 2012), Similarity Avoidance (Frisch et al. 2004), or Repetition Avoid-
ance (Walter 2007) in phonology, Identity Avoidance (van Riemsdijk 2008), Distinct-
ness (Richards 2006, 2010), or absence of X-within-X structures in syntax (Arseni-
jevic´ & Hinzen 2012). In the syntactic domain, this is also the basis for anti-locality
relations (Grohmann 2003). All these different designations essentially describe
various versions of the same observation: adjacent elements of the same type or
category are either constrained or prohibited (henceforth [*XX]), depending on how
strong the ban is argued to be. The ban spans across not only domains of grammar,
but languages too. As Berent et al. (2012) note, constraints on identity have been
shown to generalize across both natural languages (Berent & Shimron 2003, Berent
et al. 2001, 2004) and artificial ones (Marcus et al. 1999, Nevins 2010).
At the syntactic level, the postulation of such a ban that constrains or pro-
hibits identity-adjacency requires granting an identity to X in [XX]. In other words,
it requires the existence of categories. It has been recently argued that linguists to-
day are in a position to observe how functional elements such as auxiliaries and
determiners consistently appear in specific configurations that grant grammatical
identity, but still our theory about them can merely stipulate the attested orders, with
the hope to derive this stipulation in the future (Adger 2016 based on Grimshaw
1991). This is not the first time that this point is raised. Breheny & Adger argued
that in
the context of the current research programme the nature, number and
order of functional projections is a descriptive explanandum rather than
the explanation. It is a goal of current research to discover reasons why
functional categories are structured as they appear to be in terms of in-
terface properties. (Breheny & Adger 2005: 1674)
Overall, it seems that not adequate progress took place in the last decade for us to
fully develop a theory of categories that has replaced stipulations and explananda
with explanations.
Against this background, it will be argued that it is important to approach
the process of ‘granting identity’ from different perspectives in order to understand
what it corresponds to and how it is manifested cross-linguistically across cases of
typical and atypical language development. The present work defends the idea
that grammatical categories are not intrinsic to Mergeable Items (henceforth, MIs),
building on Lenneberg’s (1975) claim that syntactic objects are definable contextu-
ally. For Lenneberg, linguistic categories are to be understood as relationships, not
as absolute constructs; an idea compatible with Ross’ (1972) graded continuum of
categories. If categorial features are not intrinsic to MIs, they can be eliminated
from the Universal Grammar (UG) inventory. Eliminating them and subsequently
approaching Label as an extrasyntactic operation that falls within the ‘third-factor’
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domain would give rise to a picture that is compatible with a highly desirable, ac-
cording to Chomsky (2007), bottom-up approach to UG. This, in effect, will result
to a reduced degree of linguistic specificity that needs to be explained from an evo-
lutionary perspective.
The aim of this work is twofold. First, to construct a theory of labels (under-
stood for the purposes of the present work as containing only categorial informa-
tion) and operation Label through bringing together different strands of inquiry:
(i) linguistic constraints on adjacent tokens of the same type (e.g., van Riemsdijk’s
2008 ‘Identity Avoidance’), (ii) data that flout these constraints (Leivada 2015), (iii)
neurolinguistic arguments for category-specific impairments that raise questions
as to whether the locus of the impairment is a categorial feature per se or parts
of the information attached to the category at different levels of linguistic analysis
(Barner & Bale 2002, Tsimpli 2013), and (iv) the operation Label as the key evolu-
tionary novelty that distinguishes human language from the communication sys-
tems of other species through the development of grammatical categories which
provided “a new mode of cognizing” (Hinzen & Sheehan 2013: 73; see also Horn-
stein 2009, Hornstein & Pietroski 2009, Murphy 2015a, and Goucha et al. 2017 on
labelling as a candidate for human uniqueness). The second aim of this work is
to show that cross-linguistic constraints on identity-adjacency are neither syntactic,
nor linguistic in nature. They are the linguistic reflection of a general, cognitive
bias that filters out multiple tokens of the same type when these occur in adjacent
positions. In other words, it is true that elements of the same type do not generally
appear in adjacent positions, but not because this would cause a derivation crash as
it has been argued in the literature (Perlmutter 1971, Ross 1972, van Riemsdijk 1998,
Grohmann 2000, Richards 2010), as the examples provided in section 2.2 show.
The next section deals with labels and operation Label. After defining [*XX]
and analyzing counterexamples, the last two subsections will approach Label from
a neurological and an ethological perspective respectively. Section 3 traces the ori-
gins of Identity Avoidance (also known as Repetition Avoidance) in cognition, link-
ing anti-identity to how the brain decodes identical tokens, and presents the Novel
Information Bias together with the rationale behind it.1
2. Labels and Operation Label
When reading Lewis Carroll’s Jabberwocky for the first time, speakers of English
understand that ‘gyre’ and ‘gimble’ in ‘Twas brillig, and the slithy toves/Did gyre
and gimble in the wabe’ are verbs. Even if they do not know the meaning of these
words, they are still able to determine their category based on grammatical context.
It seems that these MIs became verbs the moment they were placed in the right
environment. They can become nouns too (e.g., ‘Did wabe and gimble in the gyre’)
and English speakers would immediately interpret them as such, if they see them
appearing in a ‘nouny’ context.2
1 The terms ‘Identity Avoidance, ‘Repetition Avoidance’ and ‘anti-identity’ are used inter-
changeably throughout this work. The first term is more prominently used in linguistics,
whereas the second is mostly used in the neurocognitive literature.
2 The connection between Jabberwocky and an exocentric interpretation of categories a` la
Lenneberg is due to Laka (2013). In her words,
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Eric Lenneberg has repeatedly argued that the categorization process is flex-
ible and linguistic categories are not absolute constructs, but relationships that are
definable only contextually (1967, 1975). In his words,
I think it is a mistake to look at categories such as noun phrase, noun,
verb, adjective, and so on, as absolute constructs. Instead, these terms
are the names of relations between concatenated words. A word such as
‘green’ is no more an adjective, a verb, a noun, or a noun phrase when
it appears in isolation than it is a subject or a predicate.
(Lenneberg 1975: 24; emphasis added)
Let us consider more closely the process of categorization that underlies
semantics. Is it possible to characterize this cognitive activity any fur-
ther? For instance, if the classification criteria are not usually physical
dimensions, what are they? The most outstanding feature of the “criterial-
ity” is its great flexibility. Sometimes the criterion is primarily one of “use
that man makes of the objects”; sometimes it is a given aspect; some-
times a certain emotional state that all objects in that class may elicit in
the viewer. Any one category is not definable by only one, consistently applied
criterion. (Lenneberg 1967: 332–333; emphasis added)
In Minimalism, Label is defined as the operation that grants identification of
the category of an MI (Chomsky 2013): Following the union of two MIs through
Merge, Label gives an identity to the newly formed MI. The syntactic configura-
tions between non-atomic, complex MIs are often viewed as relational and inter-
pretable at the interfaces (Hornstein & Nunes 2008, Chomsky 2013). The important
question is whether this identity is intrinsic to atomic, non-complex MIs. In other
words, is a noun something that is interpreted in a ‘nouny’ way at the interfaces
(Narita 2011) or does it have the ‘nouny’ feature already grafted on to it in syntax?
Also, is Identity Avoidance at the syntactic level the result of a ban that operates
within narrow syntax proper or are the attested constraints on identity-adjacency
the result of the low information value that repeated instances of ‘nouny’ elements
would have once they are ‘read’ at the interfaces? These questions will be dealt
with in the next two subsections.
2.1. Where Does Identity Avoidance Come From?
When discussing labeling, many linguists have put forth the existence of a process
or algorithm that interprets MIs contextually, at the interfaces (Pesetsky & Torrego
2004, Hornstein & Nunes 2008, Chomsky 2013). Others have argued in favor of cer-
tain MIs entering the derivation already endowed with categorial features (Cinque
1999, Rizzi 1997, Panagiotidis & Grohmann 2009, Panagiotidis 2011) or acquiring
[t]he full meaning of those words eludes us, but the grammatical scaffold set by
the recognizable function words allows us to make sense of the propositional
structure of the poem, identifying nonsense words that speak of entities, prop-
erties and events. Very importantly, function words tell us how they are related.
(Laka 2013)
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them in the course of the derivation through ‘inheriting’ them from the material
they are attached to (e.g., the ‘Categorial Identity Thesis’ according to which func-
tional heads that extend the projection of a lexical head share the categorial status
of that lexical head; van Riemsdijk 1998, Grimshaw 2005).
When it comes to Identity Avoidance in language, the precise target of the
anti-identity ban (i.e. whether the ban and its haplological effects target items that
are morphophonologically and vs. or syntactically identical) is elusive and varies
across proposals (cf. (1)–(9)). Roughly, the relevant proposals can be split into three
groups. In the first group, the interface that figures more prominently in the discus-
sions of the ban on adjacent elements of the same syntactic and/or morphophono-
logical type is the articulatory-perceptual one (Phonetic Form, PF), as in (1)–(5).
(1) I take it that at least some instances of haplology are purely morphophono-
logical. For example, Bosˇkovic´ [(2002)] and Bosˇkovic´ & Nunes (2007) provide
evidence that the ban against identical wh-phrases in multiple wh-fronting
languages is a purely PF-matter. (Boeckx 2008: 113)
(2) In our account, haplology is either phonological or motivated by independent
syntactic principles having to do with the size of the complement of a lexical
head or with the functional hierarchy. (Fa´bregas 2014: 37)
(3) The Syntactic OCP: Multiple elements with an identical morphophonological
specification are disallowed in the same Spell-Out domain at PF.
(Hiraiwa 2010)
(4) Double Determiner Filter: *[D1. . . D2] where no lexical head intervenes be-
tween D1 and D2. Determiner Deletion: Delete one of two phonologically
adjacent determiners. (Davis 2010: 23)
(5) Falling again within the realm of reduplication that ‘accidentally’ creates an
exact copy—without intending to—are cases of consonantal fixed segmen-
tism and spontaneous ‘avoidance’ that occur with echo word formation and
related phenomena. For example, English shm-reduplication results in a redu-
plicant whose onset is shm-, e.g. flowers, shmowers. Nonetheless, as a large-
scale survey by Nevins & Vaux (2003) shows, speakers do not tolerate such
reduplication when the base itself begins with this sequence. Thus, the name
schmidt must undergo alternate attempts, such as schmidt-shpidt, schmidt-flidt,
etc. Surprisingly, this phenomenon extends to practically every case of echo
reduplication that exists [. . . ]. (Nevins 2012: 109)
In the second group, the role of PF is diminished and [*ΧΧ] is described as a
purely syntactic/grammatical constraint ((6)–(9)).
(6) *XX sequences of identical functional heads are ill-formed.
(Grimshaw 1997: 170)
(7) Data concerning complementizer substitution in Dutch show that in syntax,
as in morphology, a condition that bans adjacent identical heads can have the
effect that one head is replaced by a counterpart that has the wrong fea-ture
specification for the syntactic context. (Ackema 2001: 725)
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(8) If a linearization statement <α, α> is generated, the derivation crashes. [. . . ]
Distinctness effects are crucially sensitive to syntactic structure, and are not
about linear adjacency. (Richards 2006: 4, 12)
(9) [T]here is a grammatical (non-semantic) constraint in English that prohibits
double negation, dubbed *NEG NEG [. . . ]. (Collins 2016)
The third group is the smallest one and consists of few studies that do not ap-
proach the ban on identity as linguistic (either syntax- and/or PF-induced), but as
the outcome of a more general principle of human cognition that may find applica-
tion in language, the way it finds application in other cognitive domains ((10)–(13)).
(10) [. . . ] Identity Avoidance is a general principle of biological organization: its
effect can be detected at both interfaces, PF and LF.
(van Riemsdijk 2008: 242)
(11) It seems, then, that repetition avoidance is universal in the sense that it seems
to occur in virtually every human language, in every grammatical subdo-
main, and in other cognitive domains as well. (Walter 2007: 6)
(12) Rather, identity is created in a number of ways [. . . ] but in some cases, it may
be disfavored for reasons that range from perceptual difficulty to articulatory
fatigue. (Samuels 2014: 357)
(13) Richard’s (2010) Distinctness Condition, prohibiting the presence of multi-
ple lexical units of the same label within a single phase complement, may
be the consequence of how many distinct rhythms it is possible to couple in
specific actions (Boeckx 2013). These XX-like structures (e.g., structures con-
taining multiple phase-internal nouns such as *John Mary ate apples) may be
ungrammatical because of the oscillatory patterns local language regions can
sustain. (Murphy 2015b: 13)3
In line with the main claim of the third group, in this work I will defend
the idea that Identity Avoidance is not linguistic in origin, but boils down to gen-
eral cognitive architecture, and more specifically to a bias that I call Novel Informa-
tion Bias. In what follows, I present grammatically licit, [*XX]-violating structures.
Then, I approach labels and labelling from different perspectives with the aim to
bring together all the necessary pieces in order to evaluate Novel Information Bias
and the rationale behind it in section 3.
2.2. Licit [XX]: Flouting Identity Avoidance
Identity Avoidance is a well-observed condition that operates at different levels of
linguistic analysis. At the syntactic level, many studies analyze the mechanics of
Distinctness through which anti-identity is achieved in a number of cases (e.g., by
adding structure in nominalizations: the destruction of the city vs. *the destruc-
tion the city; Alexiadou 2014). However, despite the fact that languages indeed
employ a range of grammatical options in order to avoid [XX], it would be wrong
3 For another detailed analysis of anti-identity captured in terms of oscillatory brain rhythms,
see Ramı´rez Ferna´ndez (2015).
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to conclude that [XX] patterns do not exist in various spoken and signed languages
(Leivada 2015).
The very fact that such patterns are possible suggests that, contra what has
been repeatedly claimed in the relevant literature, there is no [*XX] ban in syntax that
prevents two MIs of the same category from being merged together. More impor-
tantly, if Lenneberg’s theory is on the right track, then syntax/Merge cannot even
‘read’ whether the two MIs that it puts together belong to the same category or not,
because a category is only defined post-syntactically, in relation to the grammatical
or discourse context.4 I argue that this explains why [XX] patterns like the ones in
(14)–(16) are licit and eventually surface cross-linguistically, even despite the fact
that repeated occurrences of the same item obviously carry low information value.
(14) European Portuguese
Acho
think.1SG
que
that
amanha˜
tomorrow
que
that
a
the
Ana
Ana
que
that
vai
will
conseguir
manage
acabar
finish
o
the
trabalho.
assignment
‘I think tomorrow Ana will manage to finish the assignment.’
(Mascarenhas 2007: 10)
(15) Greek
a. Kapc¸i
some
(kapc¸i)
some
kala
well
θa
FUT
kanun
do.3PL
na
SUBJ
citun
see.3PL
ti
the
ðulia
work
tus.
POSS
‘Some people would do well to mind their own business.’
(Leivada 2015: 54)
b. Merici
some
(merici)
some
ðen
NEG
katalavenun
understand.3PL
tipota.
nothing
‘Some people don’t understand a thing.’
(16) Dutch
Ik
I
heb
have.1SG
het
it
anders
otherwise
eens
once
epresteerd
manage.PTCP
om
to
mijn
POSS
schoenen
shoes
verkeerd-om-om
wrong-around-around
aan
on
te
INF
trekken.
put.INF
‘I once managed to put my shoes on the wrong way around.’
(Aelbrecht & den Dikken 2013: 41)
These examples show adjacent occurences of functional heads, not mediated
by other functional categories. (14) features adjacent complementizers, (15) indefi-
nite articles, and (16) prepositions. The syntactic analyses of these structures have
4 This idea is also compatible with standard assumptions about the contextual definition of cate-
gories within the framework of Distributed Morphology. Consider, for instance, the following
claim by Marantz:
[r]oots like
√
DESTROY and
√
GROW (to borrow notation from Pesetsky 1995)
are category neutral, neutral between N and V. When the roots are placed in a
nominal environment, the result is a ‘nominalization’; when the roots are placed
in a verbal environment, they become verbs. (Marantz 1997: 215)
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been already discussed in detail elsewhere (Mascarenhas 2007, Aelbrecht & den
Dikken 2013, Leivada 2015), hence they will not be presented any further here.
However, it is important to note that the repeated elements in (14)–(16) are not
subject to analyses that treat the two identical tokens as belonging to different syn-
tactic categories. In this sense, Identity Avoidance violations concern syntactic cat-
egorization. Similarly, Lenneberg’s (1967) argument about the great flexibility and
contextual definition of categories does not concern only semantic categories. This
is evident in his later work:
Although words are discrete entities, they represent or are the product
of underlying continuous cognitive and physiological processes. These
deeper continuities are reflected in the “fuzzy” nature of semantic, syntac-
tic, and phonological categories, making sharp, formal distinctions and deci-
sions difficult. (Lenneberg 1975: 17; emphasis added)
In relation to the examples in (14)–(16), the important conclusion that can be reached
is that depending on which version of the ban in (1)–(9) one assumes, these exam-
ples should be illicit, as they flatly violate Identity Avoidance on both the syntactic
and the phonological level, yet they are perfectly well-formed in the languages in
which they belong.
Although these examples suggest that Identity Avoidance is not a syntactic
ban, there is no doubt that generally the existence of adjacent occurrences of syntac-
tically and/or phonologically identical MIs is severely constrained. Therefore, one
can still assume that Identity Avoidance is indeed operative in language, but cru-
cially not in the form that most studies suggest. More specifically, first it is not a hard
constraint or a ban, but a flexible bias. [XX] tends to be infrequent in languages, but
it is realized in a cross-linguistic manner, regardless of modality of externalization
(see Leivada 2015 for more examples of [XX] in spoken and signed languages). Sec-
ond, it is not a syntactic or linguistic bias. It may find application in language, but
it has parallels in other domains of human cognition (Walter 2007). If one adopts
Chomsky’s (2005) proposal about the existence of three factors in language design,
then Repetition Avoidance, not being specific to language, would fall in the third
factor.5
Insofar, the above examples have shown that licit [XX] patterns can flout
Identity Avoidance across languages and levels of analysis. However, they have
not revealed much about labels and operation Label. Is X endowed with categorial
features in syntax proper? The fact that syntax can put [XX] together can be taken
to suggest that syntactic objects acquire their label contextually, at the interfaces, as
Lenneberg (1975) and Chomsky (2013), among many others, have suggested. How-
ever, it could equally be the case that precisely because the anti-identity bias is a bias
and not an absolute ban, it can ignore the categorial features that X is endowed with
in syntax. In other words, [XX] patterns do not suffice to answer questions about
whether nouns and verbs are interpreted as such at the interfaces or they have the
corresponding ‘nouny’ and ‘verby’ features already grafted on to them in syntax.
Moreover, [XX] patterns cannot provide alone a complete understanding of the op-
5 Chomsky (2005) argued that there are three sets of factors in language design: 1) biological
endowment specific to language (UG), 2) experience, and 3) principles of general cognition
that are not specific to language.
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eration Label. For these reasons, the next two subsections will approach labels and
Label from the neurolinguistic and the ethological perspective, respectively.
2.3. A Neurolinguistic Approach to Categories
Neurolinguistic arguments for category-specific impairments raise questions as to
whether the locus of impairment is a categorial feature per se or parts of the in-
formation attached to the target form at different levels of linguistic analysis. For
instance, in the literature on aphasia and other pathological phenotypes, one finds
many case studies that show disproportionate impairment of noun vs. verb re-
trieval since the mid-1980s (Crepaldi et al. 2011, Kambanaros & Grohmann 2015).
One wonders whether this differential performance can be the result of a type of
“feature blindness” (Gopnik 1990) that is sensitive to categorial features.
Barner & Bale (2002) were among the first to address the issue of categorial
identity from a neurolinguistic perspective. Asking,
[h]asn’t it been shown that certain patients are selectively impaired for
nouns or verbs? Doesn’t this evidence mean that nouns and verbs must
be marked in the lexicon? (Barner & Bale 2002: 775)
Barner & Bale (2002) adduced two important arguments in order to give a nega-
tive answer to the last question. First, they observed that even in pathologies that
typically involve a noun-verb dissociation, it is usually seen that patients do not
omit target forms altogether. For example, if the deficit is mainly found in verbs,
what happens is that patients commonly produce a target verb in its bare infinitive
form rather than the inflected, target form. This suggests that the locus of impair-
ment boils down to morphological markers and not to categorial features. In other
words, failure to produce the inflected form entails an impairment in accessing the
surface representation of this form, at the level where morphophonological speci-
fication takes place. This explains why patients that are unable to produce a fully
inflected form can still access and correctly report information on its grammatical
features (for example, gender in the case of the patient with Alzeimer’s disease
reported in Herna´ndez et al. 2007).
Defining the different levels of access, models of language processing have
proposed that word retrieval is a process that can be divided into discrete phases:
(a) lemma selection and (b) lexeme retrieval (Levelt 1989). The lemma is an ab-
stract conceptual form without morphophonological specification. After lemma
selection, lexeme retrieval takes place: the lexeme that corresponds to the selected
lemma is morphophonologically specified. Levelt’s (1989) model has been highly
influential in neurolinguistics precisely because findings across pathologies sug-
gest that a lemma/lexeme distinction is necessary. Mapping this model to what
looks like a category-specific impairment, the difficulty lies in lexeme retrieval, not
lemma selection. The noun-verb dissociation that is found in many studies usually
boils down to atypical morphology manifested through impaired lexeme retrieval.
The second argument of Barner & Bale (2002) is that selective impairments
that affect one category are often shown to be modality-specific too. They cite the
case report of Caramazza & Hillis (1991) that involves a patient who, although
impaired in her spoken production of target verbs, showed no problem writing
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the same words. This dissociation between modalities would not be possible if the
locus of the impairment was the Verb category, as Caramazza & Hillis (1991) also
note. If a categorial feature was truly impaired or inaccessible in this patient, how
is it possible that in some modalities it appeared completely unaffected?
It has been recently argued that the question as to whether the category dis-
tinction itself is the driving force of the selective impairment of some categories or
whether semantic and perceptual distinctions in nouns and verbs are responsible
for the attested effects is not resolved yet (Tsimpli 2013). For this reason, I will
review below three case studies that show selective impairment of some category
with the aim to show that the attested impairment is not due to a category deficit,
but to morphophonological realization at the surface level (i.e. lexeme retrieval).
Herna´ndez et al. (2007) present the case of a Spanish-Catalan bilingual woman
(LPM) with Alzheimer’s disease whose linguistic production shows a category-
specific deficit. In naming tasks, her performance was significantly better for verbs
compared to nous. Herna´ndez et al. (2007) present this as a case of a category-
specific impairment, but it is important to highlight three crucial aspects of their
results before evaluating the ‘category-specific’ nature of the deficit. First, LPM has
access to semantic representations for both verbs and nouns as evidenced by her
high performance in a word-picture matching task that used the same material as
the naming task. Second, she does not show the noun-verb dissociation in com-
prehension tasks. Third, some of her errors consist of circumlocutions that reveal
intact access to both verbs and nouns, although not always the target ones (e.g.,
target response: tostadora ‘toaster’, actual response: sirve para tostar el pan ‘used to
toast bread’). In this example, LPM makes a naming error in the ‘noun’ condition.
The target noun is not produced, but another noun is used in the circumlocution
she employs. How is it possible that LPM can produce this noun in a grammatical
way if the N feature is missing from her repository due to a category-specific fea-
ture blindness? In sum, LPM seems to have trouble accessing the target lexemes.
Her naming errors involve morphological paraphasias (e.g., target response: planxa
‘iron’, actual response: *planxadora, a neologism) and this suggests that the locus of
the impairment is not a categorial feature, but impaired access to morphophono-
logical specification at the lexeme level. As verbs and nouns involve different mor-
phological markers, different degrees of disruption are possible, hence the attested
verb-noun dissociation. Similar results have been robustly found in other impaired
phenotypes too (e.g., anomic aphasia; Kambanaros 2008).
Laiacona & Caramazza (2004) present two cases that show verb-noun dissoci-
ation: EA, a man suffering from herpes simplex encephalitis and MR, a woman who
has suffered a stroke. EA showed a better performance in naming actions, whereas
MR was better in naming objects. Laiacona & Caramazza argue that their results
suggest that “a possible grammatical-specific deficit could be detected” (2004: 110).
In these cases, too, there are indications that the locus of impairment is not a cat-
egorial feature. First, both EA and MR performed at ceiling (above 98 %) in the
picture-word matching task. This suggests that they had access problems: they
were not able to retrieve and produce the target word, but they were able to cor-
rectly select it and match it with a picture, once presented with it. Also, both EA and
MR had problems with morphology: EA with irregular noun morphology (mainly
producing the plural forms) and MR with verbal morphology both regular and ir-
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regular. Finally, notice that the lowest accuracy performance in the picture naming
task was 42 % (EA: actions: 82 %, objects: 42 %; MR: actions: 70 %, objects: 90 %); a
strikingly high percentage for somebody that has a deficient N feature. Overall, it
seems that in these case studies too, one cannot straightforwardly witness a missing
or impaired categorial feature.
To claim a neural basis, one needs to refer to case studies that show (seman-
tic) category dissociations because of a discrete lesion in a specific brain area. This
does not imply the need to find a one-to-one mapping (i.e. a linguistic primitive
that corresponds to a unique disorder or maps onto a single brain area). Some
loci of impairment at the neural level are, however, expected to be consistently
present. Indeed, certain category-specific semantic deficits have been associated to
brain regions. However, these refer to highly specific semantic distinctions, such
as vegetables vs. fruits, and not to broad semantic distinctions that are based on
lexical category, such as nouns vs. verbs. For instance, the case study presented in
Levin et al. (2005) is that of a man who exhibited a language impairment following
a left anterior thalamic infarction. His naming abilities were selectively impaired
with some categories (e.g., tools, clothes, transportation, fruits) being better pre-
served than others (e.g., vegetables, toys, animals and body parts) in the visual
modality. Crucially, much like the comprehension-production dichotomy observed
earlier, here too a dichotomy is found between naming in animate and inanimate
categories in the visual and tactile modalities, but not when the patient responded
to auditory stimuli. In Barbeau & Giusiano (2003), another patient showed lesions
located primarily in the left inferior temporal lobe, and his linguistic behaviour
involved a dissociation between the manufactured vs. natural objects category. In
other research, a specific type of nouns, that of manipulable objects, has been linked
to lesions in the posterior middle temporal gyrus (Campanella et al. 2010).
The message that emerges is clear: Topographical differences in brain activa-
tion are not driven by broad semantic distinctions that are based on lexical category
(e.g., nouns vs. verbs), but by finer semantic distinctions (e.g., concrete noun/verb
vs. abstract noun/verb; Moseley & Pulvermu¨ller 2014). These results suggest that
categories that are based on lexical class are theoretical constructs and not discrete
primitives that drive brain representation as such. A variety of different reasons
support this claim. First, there is no confirmed discrete lesion pattern for a noun-
verb dissociation; the attested dissociations are based on finer semantic distinctions
and a categorial feature such as ‘noun’ is never consistently impaired. Second, the
dissociation is not preserved across modalities, and it should be if the locus of im-
pairment truly was a categorial feature. Third, apart from modality effects, task
effects have also been observed (e.g., see Kambanaros 2014 on how the vulnerabil-
ity of verbs in children with Specific Language Impairment shows up in naming
tasks but not in connected speech).
The discussion has so far revolved around nouns and verbs because this dis-
sociation has been the focus of attention in the relevant literature. However, if
categorial feature blindness existed, it could conceivably apply to functional cat-
egories. Yet, there is no known case of a patient with a developmental or an ac-
quired disorder that has suffered a total loss of a category (e.g., no nouns can be
produced/comprehended) or that consistently misapplies labels in a way that re-
sults to the use of complementizers where one expects to see determiners or clitics
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when one expects modals, due to categorial feature blindness. Also, a sharp differ-
ence is consistently found between affected production and intact comprehension
across patients and pathologies. These observations suggest that in studies that re-
port a category-specific deficit, the locus of impairment is not the categorial feature
per se, but part of the information attached to the target forms at the various phases
of lexical access.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the neurolinguistics literature does not
seem to offer cases in support of missing or damaged categorial features. This
absence can raise concerns as to whether categorial features exist at all as separate
entities in a feature inventory. Going back to Narita’s (2011) question, seeing that
an impaired noun feature does not exist as such in the findings of neurolinguistics
paves the way for arguing that a noun is something that is interpreted in a ‘nouny’
way in relation to the environment in which it is encountered. This conclusion
supports Lenneberg’s (1967, 1975) claim that nouns, verbs, and other categories,
are not absolute constructs, but flexibly established and contextually defined relations
between words.
2.4. Operation Label as the Key Evolutionary Novelty?
The main aim so far was to show that labels are not intrinsic to MIs and constraints
on identity-adjacency do not have a linguistic —much less syntactic—origin. In-
stead, these constraints have been described as language-external and deriving
from a general cognitive bias. In addition, it has been argued that nothing attests to
categorial features having the status of individual primitives in the neurolinguis-
tics/clinical linguistics literature. Based on what has been reviewed so far, it seems
that Label is an extra-syntactic operation and that MIs are granted their identity
contextually.
Switching to an ethological perspective, the picture somewhat changes. Sev-
eral studies have suggested that the operation Label is the locus of human unique-
ness, the novelty that distinguishes human language from the communication sys-
tems of other species (Hornstein 2009, Hornstein & Pietroski 2009, Murphy 2015a,
Goucha et al. 2017). If a labelling algorithm that forms asymmetric hierarchical
structures in syntax is indeed the key evolutionary novelty, Label belongs to the
core of the language faculty (FL) and should fall in the first factor in language de-
sign (UG, according to Chomsky 2005) or FLN(arrow), if one adopts the distinction
between narrow and broad FL (Hauser et al. 2002). Yet the theses reviewed so far
suggest the opposite. More concretely, going back to how categories are treated
in Lenneberg (1967), the difference between human language and systems of com-
munication in other species is quantitative, not qualitative. Lenneberg has argued
that most animals organize the world by some process of categorization which is
not formally different than man’s concept formation, but only differs in terms of
the number of total possibilities for categorization that exist (1967: 331-332). If the
categorization process is not peculiar to man—and it is not per Lenneberg—, we
can employ a bottom-up approach to animal and human cognition(de Waal & Fer-
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rari 2010) by discussing the shared properties of categories in human language and
those in other species’ ‘language’.
Comparing human language to animal communication, Berwick et al. (2013)
highlight the flexibility of labels in the latter, but not in the former, when they write
that
[a]s an example of this gap [between the two], Laura-Ann Petitto, one of
the leading researchers of primate communication and early language
acquisition, observes that a chimpanzee uses the label for ‘apple’ to refer
to ‘the action of eating apples, the location where apples are kept, events
and locations of objects other than apples that happened to be stored
with an apple (the knife used to cut it), and so on and so forth—all
simultaneously, and without apparent recognition of the relevant dif-
ferences or the advantages of being able to distinguish among them’
([Petitto 2005:] 86). (Berwick et al. 2013: 92)
However, it is precisely this great flexibility of categories that Lenneberg (1967) has
called the “most outstanding feature of human ‘criteriality’” in the context of human
language. Data from languages that are not heavily grammaticalized suggest that
he is right. Riau Indonesian in (17) is one such case.
(17) Riau Indonesian
ayam
chicken
makan
eat
(an association of CHICKEN and EAT)
(Gil 2009: 23)
The MIs in (17) receive their grammatical identity post-syntactically, depending on
the context. (17) can thus mean that ‘the chicken is/was eating’ or ‘the chickens
that were eaten’ or ‘the reason chickens eat’. Overall, it seems that a great degree of
flexibility is involved when interrelating the MIs that make up (17). If categories are
defined post-syntactically, there are no ‘nouny’ or ‘verby’ features per se in syntax,
which would then explain why such as a feature inventory fails to show up as
atypical in the neurolinguistics literature.
One could observe at this point that Lenneberg talks about broad semantic
distinctions when he argues that nouns and adjectives are not absolute constructs,
whereas Berwick et al. (2013) talk about narrow, individual labels (e.g., apple to
refer to APPLE, instead of the broader label ‘noun’). However, flexibility charac-
terizes both types of labels in human language. Data from Riau Indonesian paint
only half of the picture in showing that broad distinctions—such as noun, verb,
and tense—can be flexibly established as context-dependent relations between MIs
(granting support to Lenneberg’s claim). Data from recently emerged sign lan-
guages paint the other half, providing unique insights into how narrow labels are
flexible too. Importantly, these data defy one of the design characteristics (in the
sense of Hockett 1960) of human language: signifier-signified consistency. This
term refers precisely to the (synchronically) inflexible nature of the association be-
tween apple and APPLE in human language. Unlike other species (see Berwick et
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al.’s earlier point), humans that speak English will form this association in a con-
sistent fashion, without changing ‘apple’ into another string of sounds for denot-
ing APPLE and without attaching to this string of sounds a different concept. Yet,
studies on different ‘newborn’ sign languages have noted the absence of this consis-
tency in the early stages of the development of a language (figure 1). Washabaugh
(1986) on Providence Island Sign Language and Sandler et al. (2011) on Al-Sayyid
Bedouin Sign Language give similar reports on how consistency gradually improves
over new generations of speakers.
Figure 1: Absence of signifier-signified consistency in Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language—three
variants of CAT (Meir et al. 2010: 19).
Gradual development entails that the fact that some languages do not employ
a verb-noun distinction (see Tkachman & Sandler 2013 for examples) does not mean
that the speakers or signers of these languages cannot employ it. Absence of use
does not entail absence of ability; the former may depend on many environmental
factors. Crucially, the same argument can be evoked for other species. Consider,
for instance, how Bengalese finches, the long-domesticated strain of white-rumped
munia, have developed a phonologically and syntactically richer repertoire in com-
parison to their wild relatives (Okanoya 2012). White-rumped munia songs could
have been equally complex, but they are not, because of the different environmen-
tal needs that drive their performance (e.g., strength of sexual selection; Okanoya
2015). In this context, other species may lack—to the best of our knowledge—a range
of semantic categories that is quantitatively comparable to ours, but this speaks
about actual use, not ability.6
6 Green & Marler (1979) raise a similar point for primate languagelike behavior, when dis-
cussing the linguistic abilities of chimpanzee Sarah (Premack 1971):
Within her repertoire of about 130 words were not only many nouns, verbs, and
adjectives but also more complex constructions, such as same, and different, ques-
tions, and the conditional if-then. [. . . ] The accomplishments of chimpanzees
using languagelike systems of signaling to converse with an experimenter are
surely the highest animal attainments demonstrated so far. Yet, they also raise a
curious dilemma. If a chimpanzee can indeed achieve some elementary compe-
tence with language when provided with an appropriate vehicle, why is the evi-
dence for symbolic usage in nature so limited? It may well be that the paucity of
our knowledge of natural communication in animals is such that we can hardly
judge whether such abilities are demonstrated in nature or not. However, it is also
possible that in most social interactions, animals have little use for languagelike
patterns of communication [. . . ].
(Green & Marler 1979: 133–134; emphasis added)
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The inter- and intraspeaker variability found in ‘newborn’ sign languages
is extensive (Washabaugh 1986), clearly pointing to the fact that both narrow and
broad labels can allow for some degree of flexibility in human language. For the
purposes of the present discussion, the important conclusion is that data from dif-
ferent spoken and signed languages attest to the fact that “category distinctions
do not come ready-made into language” (Tkachman & Sandler 2013: 277). These
data grant further support to Lenneberg’s (1967, 1975) view of categories as flexibly
established and contextually defined relations.
Going back to the ethological literature, despite the line of studies that sug-
gest that Label is the locus of humaniqueness, it seems that other species do have
a range of broad, contextually-defined categories (i.e. broad labels) in their reper-
toire. In animal communication, vocal labeling refers to incidents in which an an-
imal consistently uses an acoustic signal when presented with a specific object or
class of objects (King & Janik 2013). Primatologists have argued that non-human
primates possess a number of calls—alarm calls, copulation calls, moving grunts
when foraging, infant handling grunts, contact barks, contest wahoos—that func-
tion as semantic labels linked both to real-world relations and to other elements in
the repertoire itself (Cheney & Seyfarth 1997, 2010).7 This is reminiscent of hu-
man language, where words may refer to real-world entities and be semantically
related with other words. Second, similar to how nouns and verbs in human lan-
guage “represent different viewpoints on concepts” (Panagiotidis 2015: 2), the calls
of Diana monkeys seem to represent different viewpoints on the type of stimuli
they denote. More specifically, when perceiving a threat, their alarm calls indi-
cate the predator’s biological class: they represent predator category in a referential
way,8 and these calls are interpreted as such by conspecifics regardless of imme-
diacy of threat or direction of attack (Zuberbu¨hler 2000). Third, these alarm calls
encode other types of semantic information (e.g., elevation, distance) through vocal
tract filtering, another ability once thought to be restricted to human speech (Zu-
berbu¨hler 2000, Riede & Zuberbu¨hler 2003). Last, as happens in human language,
non-human primates may take into account pragmatic context when interpreting call
meaning (e.g., the peep calls of bonobos; Clay et al. 2015).
Narrow labels are also found in the communication systems of other species.
Baboons can process argument structure and reference to the extent of understand-
ing the difference between Sylvia threatens Hannah and Hannah threatens Sylvia (Ch-
eney & Seyfarth 2007). Even more special is the case of Bottlenose dolphins, which
have the signature whistle in their repertoire; a unique signal that encodes individ-
ual identity independently of voice features (King & Janik 2013). Much like narrow
labels in human language, this whistle labels individuals in a way that involves a
stable association between a signifier and a signified.
7 As Cheney & Seyfarth (1997) clarify, these labels really deserve the designation ‘semantic’,
because they evoke the same responses from recipients as do the stimuli to which they refer.
8 Kaplan (2008) and Watson et al. (2015) have also found use of referential calls in the repertoire
of Australian magpies and chimpanzees, respectively. With respect to the latter, it was found
that the referential vocalizations of chimpanzees were not determined by arousal, leading
Watson et al. (2015) to claim that the socially learned aspect of reference in human language
has ancient evolutionary origins, uncovering yet another similarity between human language
and non-human communication systems.
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All these different labels that are scattered in the repertoire of different species
beg the question of whether Label is truly the locus of humaniqueness. While it is
probably true that other species do not possess as many fine-grained categorial dis-
tinctions as humans, this section aimed to show that they have some, in agreement
with Lenneberg’s (1967) proposal that the categorization process is not peculiar to
man. What degree of uniqueness does the description “unique to human language”
require then? When a property has parallels in the communication systems of other
species, shouldn’t some degree of difference be tolerated, given that we deal with
quite different physiological implementations of this property across species? If the
answer is positive, labels seem to fall in the domain of properties that are shared
across different species.9
3. Decoding Adjacent Tokens of the Same Type: The Novel Information Bias
It has been argued that anti-identity derives from a cognitive bias that is diffused
across domains of human cognition (Walter 2007, van Riemsdijk 2008, Samuels
2014). Not being specific to language, it would be a third factor bias, if one adopts
Chomsky’s (2005) proposal about the existence of three factors in language design.
Within linguistics, few works have recognized this domain-general character of
anti-identity (see ((10)–(13)). Two of the studies that elaborate on its origin are
Walter (2007) and Murphy (2015b).
Starting from the latter, Murphy’s effort to derive linguistic constraints by trac-
ing their origins in the brain is definitely on the right track when the aim is to reach
explanatory adequacy. There is, however, a slight caveat to be considered: his back-
ground assumptions in (13) seem too strong, given that grammatically licit coun-
terexamples exist. If little verbs count as phase heads, as is standardly assumed,
and Collins (2002) is right about serial verb compounds in ‡Hoan adjoining to a
little verb v, the result is a phase head that has two elements of the same label in
its complement. In other words, the presence of multiple lexical units of the same
label within a single phase complement is not prohibited. Importantly, if Lenneberg
is right about the contextual definition of categories, nothing could prohibit it, be-
cause an MI does not go into the derivation bearing categorial features such as N, V,
or v. Put another way, if the labels of the elements that build up the complement of
a phase head are (contextually) granted after transfer, how could identity-adjacency
be first detected and then prohibited in syntax proper, within the narrow confine of
a complement? Data from different languages ((14)–(16), see also Collins 2002 and
Leivada 2015) show that it is not.
Walter (2007) offers an extensive analysis of anti-identity, dealing with its be-
havioral manifestations both in language and other cognitive domains, and iden-
tifying various reasons as an explanation of the fact that humans avoid adjacent
repetitions of the same element. Her ‘Biomechanical Repetition Avoidance Hypoth-
9 Accepting the position that the categorization process is not unique to man does not alter the
fact that labelling in humans is implemented through language. One could then ask whether
any of the specifics of the labeling algorithm are unique to human language. In sum, labeling
has parallels in the communication systems of other species, but this does not change the
fact that when manifested in human language, labeling uses some linguistic machinery and
inevitably acquires a linguistic dress.
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esis’ (BRAH) in (18) offers a physiological explanation, while she also recognizes the
possibility of a perceptual motivation (19).
(18) Biomechanical Repetition Avoidance Hypothesis
Repetition of articulatory gestures is relatively difficult. This difficulty results
in phonetic variation.
(19) The Repetition Deficit
Repeated items are at times not perceived as different occurrences at all. This
tendency is a general characteristic of human cognition.
(18) entails that in [XX] sequences, it is likely that the two elements will not be
realized identically, in agreement with those studies that highlight the role of PF in
deriving anti-identity (i.e. ((1)–(5)). (19) has its roots in a phenomenon called Repeti-
tion Blindness: It has been shown that in rapid serial visual presentation of words—
above normal reading rate but well within limits of accurate reading potential—,
subjects have difficulty in detecting repeated words (Kanwisher 1987 et seq.). This
phenomenon is not restricted to language. It also occurs between color patches
(Kanwisher et al. 1995), pictures of natural objects (Buffat et al. 2013), and visu-
ally different items that are phonologically similar and semantically related (e.g., a
picture of the sun and the word “sun”) or phonologically similar and semantically
unrelated (e.g., a picture of the sun and the word “son”; Bavelier 1994).
A concrete illustration of the fact that humans avoid repetitions is the ‘ap-
parent motion’ illusion: Identical stimuli flashed in different locations are usually
perceived as a single moving stimulus. People show a clear preference for per-
ceiving these identical stationary tokens that blink on and off alternatively as one
moving token (Vetter et al. 2012 and references therein). Language is not involved
in this illusion; a fact that suggests that there is a bias towards anti-identity that is
operative across domains of cognition.
Another example of repetition avoidance in human cognition outside the do-
main of language comes from experiments that measure random number genera-
tion. It has been consistently found that adjacent repetitions of the same element
are avoided in human response sequencing (Towse 1998, Towse & Neil 1998), even
if participants were not instructed to not produce them. The tendency is to avoid
repetitions among immediately adjacent responses and to repeat after a lag of sev-
eral responses. The explanation given for this performance is rooted in a general
cognitive mechanism that inhibits responses that have been just produced (Towse
1998).
Comparing the different motivations behind anti-identity that are given in
(18) and (19), it seems that the former would have trouble explaining the numerous
cases where human language licenses multiple adjacent tokens of the same type for
specific reasons.10 For example, there are songs that repeat many times the same
word. In telephone closings, a final farewell token such as ‘bye’ or ‘ciao’ is often
repeated a couple of times (Auer et al. 1999 document cases of extensive repeti-
tion), probably serving as a conversation hedge. Reduplications of the same item
when cursing are also typical in language (see Corver 2014 for data), strengthening
10 I am grateful to Henk van Riemsdijk and Norbert Corver for bringing various cases of item
repetition to my attention.
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emotive content (Potts 1997). Moreover, item repetition is often used for achieving
contrastive focus (Ghomeshi et al. 2004). Interestingly, even if in all those situa-
tions the repeated item is realized just a couple of times, there are occasions where
the repetition is considerably broader than what one would expect if articulatory
fatigue was the reason that humans avoid repetitions in language.11
Observing that there are contexts that call for adjacent repetitions of identi-
cal tokens, the next aim is to identify the motivation and exact circumstances that
lead to flouting Identity Avoidance in language. The hypothesis put forth in (20)
is developed on the basis of Kanwisher et al.’s (1995) observation that the atten-
tional system responsible for integrating information of types and tokens may be
unable to bind the appropriate identity (type) to distinct, adjacent representations
(tokens). The novelty of this hypothesis boils down to offering an explanation as to
why different degrees of Identity Avoidance-violations are realized in different lin-
guistic circumstances, depending on whether novel information is presented or not. This
explains why in (14)-(16) there are at most two or three repetitions of X—there are
no grammatically licit structures that feature five adjacent complementizers—, but
in a context where no new information is conveyed (e.g., telephone closings, songs,
broadcasting while waiting for the match to resume etc.), five adjacent tokens of
the same type are perfectly possible.
(20) Novel Information Bias (NIB)
Subjects avoid tokenizing multiple, adjacent occurrences of the same type,
because of a general bias in the cognitive system to provide more attentional
resources to novel information, enhancing perception and production pro-
cesses accordingly.
At the phenotypic level, the applications of NIB are so central to human lan-
guage that if the process that underlies self-avoidance is consistently disrupted in
contexts where new information should be conveyed, the result is an impairment
called palilalia. Found in various neurological and psychiatric disorders, such as
(early-onset) schizophrenia (Ferrara et al. 2006) and, more generally, in the psy-
chosis spectrum (Geschwind 1974), palilalia involves repetition of entire words or
utterances.12 It is not an articulation-related disorder confined to spoken languages;
cases of palilalia in the signed modality have been documented too (Tyrone & Woll
2008). (21) offers an example of palilalia in a patient with schizophrenia.
(21) Doctor: Okay, so [PATIENT NAME], you’ve been hearing voices.
Patient: Yes, sir.
Doctor: Uh, is that, like, every day?
Patient: Not every day, yeah, every day, every –
11 To give one example, presenting the 2015 Champions League final, Lluı´s Flaquer announced
the first goal of the match, producing ‘goal’ more than 20 times in a row in a time frame of 22
seconds.
12 Patients with schizophrenia also perform slightly worse than neurotypical controls in tasks
that measure Repetition Blindness (Kammer et al. 1998). Interestingly, a disruption in the pro-
cess that underlies anti-identity at the phenotypic level may occur in parallel to a disruption in
self-avoidance at the cellular level. Dysfunction of protocadherins, a group of transmembrane
proteins that regulate dentrite self-avoidance, has been repeatedly implicated in schizophre-
nia and other neurological disorders (Hirabayashi & Yagi 2014, Hayashi & Takeichi 2015).
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Doctor: Every day.
Patient: Every, every . . .
(Steuber 2011: 19)
Naturally, attention deficits are also fundamental in schizophrenia (Fioravanti et al.
2005), as NIB is directly related to how our system of attention filters incom-ing
information, allowing the ‘proactive’ brain (Bar 2007) to extract the important parts
and generate focused predictions about the future.
Kanwisher et al.’s (1995) observation that the attentional system responsible
for decoding types and tokens may be unable to link repeated representations of
the same type to different tokens can be connected with theories of how our parser
deals with received messages and especially to the possibility of interference by
various sources. More specifically, according to Shannon’s (1948) mathematical the-
ory of communication (figure 2), the transmission of a message can be affected by
noise sources.
Figure 2: Shannon’s (1948) schematic diagram of a general communication system.
The signal that the receiver gets can be corrupted because of noise at both
the transmitter and receiver ends, hence the receiver must reconstitute the original
message. The crucial part here is what Gallistel & King call one of Shannon’s most
“profound insights”:
What was essential about a message was not its meaning but rather that
it be selected from a set of possible messages. Shannon realized that for a
communication system to work efficiently—for it to transmit the maxi-
mum amount of information in the minimum amount of time—both the
transmitter and the receiver had to know what the set of possible mes-
sages was and the relative likelihood of the different messages within
the set of possible messages.
(Gallistel & King 2009: 6; emphasis in original)
Recognizing that the intended message is subject to noise due to a multitude
of production errors that can interfere with its contents (e.g., wrong retrievals, tip-
of-the-tongue states, self-interruptions, false starts, phonetic execution errors), the
receiver knows that it is quite likely that many adjacent tokens of the same type
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would constitute noise. If the parser’s goal is to receive the maximum amount of
information in the minimum amount of time, the parser must keep track of the
key characteristics of noise and orient attention accordingly. Generalizing this ef-
fect, one obtains NIB: Receivers reconstitute the message, focusing their attention
to novel information and filtering out potential noise. Adjacent repetitions are a
prime candidate for the latter. In this context, NIB predicts that in situations where
no new information is supposed to be conveyed, Identity Avoidance can be flouted
to a greater degree (e.g., telephone closings, songs, etc.). Also, since NIB is a cog-
nitive bias and not a syntactic ban, [XX(X)] is possible in grammar (as shown in
(14)–(16)), although heavily constrained for obvious reasons. No language would
deploy sentences with ten adjacent prepositions, determiners, or complementizers,
because a big part of that message would have a very low information value. If
such a sentence was realized, the receiver would recognize that repetitions are due
to production errors or, in more serious cases, a disorder that affects linguistic per-
formance (e.g., palilalia).
NIB could also be the source of Towse’s (1998) performance bias that is respon-
sible for inhibiting responses that have been just produced in random number gen-
eration. Based on the knowledge that repetitions are often filtered out as noise, NIB
diffuses across domains of cognition, across comprehension and production tasks,
and across settings, effectively establishing optimal conditions for communication
at both the transmitter and receiver ends. Support for this claim comes from a re-
cent experiment that involved random number generation, in which it was found
that the tendency to avoid repetitions is evident even in dyadic production set-
tings (Towse et al. 2016). In other words, not only were self-generated repetitions
avoided, but participants monitored the alternation of responses in the dyadic set-
ting, consistently avoiding immediately adjacent repetitions. Towse et al. (2016)
interpreted this finding as showing that repetition avoidance is not just an output
effect. Since repetition avoidance is shown to be much broader than inhibition of
one’s own production, its origins should be searched elsewhere. NIB is one possible
source.
The literature on the development of different types of attentional mecha-
nisms seems to lend support to NIB. It has been shown that infants display an
experience-independent bias which makes words that feature adjacent reduplica-
tions (e.g., neenee) easier to learn than non-reduplicated words (Ota & Skarabela
2016). This happens because in the course of development, exogenous attention,
which is driven by salient environmental stimuli, becomes operative earlier than
endogenous attention, which allows for voluntary, selective control of which stim-
uli will be attended (Posner & Cohen 1984). It has been even suggested that the
register-specific reduplications that one founds in infant-direct speech (i.e. baby
talk) possibly evolved as a response to the innate predisposition of infants to seg-
ment better words with adjacently repeated phonological elements than words that
involve no such repetitions (Ota & Skarabela 2017).
Salient features such as adjacent repetitions function as attentional attractors
that may facilitate language learning in the early stages of development (de Diego-
Balaguer et al. 2016). For example, infants’ ability to generalize the detection of
non-adjacent dependencies (e.g., this chair vs. these chairs) occurs when they are first
presented with familiar stems, whereas learning is altered if their attention is drawn
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by a novel, intervening nonce word (e.g., this blem vs. these blems; Soderstrom et al.
2002). At later stages of development, the maturation of the endogenous system
enables infants to ignore ‘salient stimulus’-driven properties of their environment,
in favor of orienting their attention to the relevant information (de Diego-Balaguer et
al. 2016). Relating these findings to NIB, receivers increasingly rely on endogenous
attention when reconstituting messages, because the (mature) parser needs to filter
out noise and communicate effectively in the least costly possible manner.
At the neural level, it has been argued that goal-driven attention (roughly cor-
responding to endogenous attention), involves the dorsal frontoparietal network,
whereas the ventral frontoparietal network, which detects task-relevant stimuli,
underlies stimulus-driven (i.e. exogenous) attention (Corbetta et al. 2008). The ven-
tral pathway matures earlier than the dorsal pathway (Dubois et al. 2015), explain-
ing why our attentional system is more ‘salient stimulus’-driven at the beginning.
At the subcortical level, the main structure of interest is the hippocampus. Goal-
driven, endogenous attention affects the magnitude of encoding-related activity in
the hippocampus (Aly & Turk-Browne 2016), the maturation of which is generally
considered to be slower than that of other structures (Østby et al. 2009). Perhaps
unsurprisingly then, its modulating signal has been shown to be implicated in rep-
etition suppression and enhancement (Kremers et al. 2014). In recent research,
the hippocampus has been directly connected with what one may call ‘the neural
signature of Identity Avoidance’. More specifically, it was found that when sub-
jects are presented with identical patterns of events, this overlap triggers a ‘repul-
sion’ among hippocampal representations, which is resolved by the hippocampus
through reducing similarity among representations (Chanales et al. 2017).
In this context, one can predict that the process of identity inhibition will
be disrupted in patients with abnormal hippocampal representations, and indeed,
repetition avoidance has been reported to be less evident among hippocampal am-
nesics (Brugger et al. 1992, 1996a). A high incidence of repetitions is also attested
in patients with damage in the right frontal lobe (Brugger et al. 1996b). Aberrances
in the frontal lobe, the hippocampus, and the parahippocampal gyrus have been
often associated with a high risk for developing psychosis/schizophrenia (Du et
al. 2017, Hill et al. 2017) and with conditions that involve palilalia (Peterson et al.
2007, Cho et al. 2009).
Overall, one can observe across different levels and types of stimuli that the
human brain does not like to process identical representations, hence it employs a
number of ways to reduce similarity. At the neural level, protocadherins underlie
dentritic self-avoidance and self-/non-self-discrimination, which function as strate-
gies that endow neurons with distinct molecular identities (Lefebvre et al. 2012). At
the behavioural level, NIB is operative, leading again to the use of various strate-
gies in order to break identity-adjacency (e.g., in the case of language through the
addition of structure among identical nodes). It is important to recognize that the
development of these strategies in language is not driven by a constraint that pre-
vents a token from being merged with another token of the same type/category.
Instead, the origin is a general bias in the cognitive system to provide more atten-
tional resources to novel information, than to repeated information, given that the
latter is a prime candidate for noise. In this context, Identity Avoidance is the lin-
guistic manifestation of a more general, cognitive bias. In the linguistics literature,
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the fact that Identity Avoidance is simply a bias and not a hard constraint that leads
to crashed derivations and unacceptable sentences, although usually overlooked,
has been already recognized in Chomsky’s (1967) appendix to Lenneberg’s seminal
book Biological Foundations of Language:
The normal use of language relies in an essential way on this unbound-
edness, on the fact that language contains devices for generating sen-
tences of arbitrary complexity. Repetition of sentences is a rarity; inno-
vation, in accordance with the grammar of the language, is the rule in
ordinary day-by-day performance.
(Chomsky 1967: 400; emphasis added)
4. Outlook
The present work defended Lenneberg’s (1967, 1974) idea that categories are not
absolute constructs, but flexibly established and contextually defined relations be-
tween words. A review of categorial identity from the neurolinguistic perspective
showed that categorial features lack a status of separate entities in a feature in-
ventory, in agreement with Lenneberg’s (1974) claim about categories existing on
a continuum rather than being discretely demarcated entities. The review of the
ethological literature has suggested that a number of semantic categories is scat-
tered in the repertoire of different species, thus granting support to the claim that
the categorization process is not peculiar to man (Lenneberg 1967). Having devel-
oped an understanding of what categories are, this work then focused on Identity
Avoidance. It was shown that this is a flexible bias, and not a hard constraint or
ban, which is why communicative needs can flout it.
Grammatically licit [XX] structures are found cross-linguistically, although
it is true that the existence of adjacent tokens of the same type is severely con-
strained. The reason is that our parser focuses on novel information, avoiding to
bind one type to distinct, adjacent tokens (Kanwisher et al. 1995). In relation to
language, this hypothesis is formally captured under the Novel Information Bias,
which predicts that in situations where no new information is supposed to be con-
veyed, Identity Avoidance can be flouted to a greater degree. The literature on the
development of different types of attentional mechanisms grants support to this
proposal, explaining why our attentional system is more ‘salient stimulus’-driven
at the early stages of development. On the contrary, the mature parser relies more
on endogenous attention in order to focus on novel information and filter out noise.
All in all, the interdisciplinary take on labels and Identity Avoidance pre-
sented here might be a step in the process of developing a theory of categories that
has replaced explananda with explanations. In this work, these explanations were
based on insights coming not only from the study of language, but also from recent
findings in attention, cognitive processing, neurology, and ethology. It is likely that
this interdisciplinarity will eventually prove to be instrumental in finally under-
standing both what a label is and whether it is unique to man.
What’s in (a) Label? 243
References
Ackema, Peter. 2001. Colliding complementizers in Dutch: another syntactic OCP
effect. Linguistic Inquiry 32, 717–727.
Adger, David. 2016. A Menagerie of Merges. Baggett Lectures, Lecture I, University
of Maryland.
Aelbrecht, Lobke & Marcel den Dikken. 2013. Preposition doubling in Flemish
and its implications for the syntax of Dutch PPs. The Journal of Comparative
Germanic Linguistics 16, 33–68.
Alexiadou, Artemis. 2014. Exploring the limitations of identity effects in syntax. In
Kuniya Nasukawa & Henk van Riemsdijk (eds.), Identity Relations in Gram-
mar, 199–224. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Aly, Mariam & Nicholas B. Turk-Browne. 2016. Attention promotes episodic encod-
ing by stabilizing hippocampal representations. PNAS 113(4), E420–E429.
Arsenijevic´, Boban & Wolfram Hinzen. 2012. On the absence of X-within-X recur-
sion in human grammar. Linguistic Inquiry 43, 423–440.
Auer, Peter, Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen & Frank Mu¨ller. 1999. Language in Time: The
Rhythm and Tempo of Spoken Interaction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bar, Moshe. 2007. The proactive brain: using analogies and associations to generate
predictions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11(7), 280–289.
Barbeau Emmanuel & Bernard Giusiano. 2003. Category-specific visual agnosia:
Lesion to semantic memory versus extra-lesional variables in a case study
and a connectionist model. Brain and Cognition 53, 433–440.
Barner, David & Alan Bale. 2002. No nouns, no verbs: psycholinguistic arguments
in favor of lexical underspecification. Lingua 112, 771–791.
Bavelier, Daphne. 1994. Repetition blindness between visually different items: the
case of pictures and words. Cognition 51, 199–236.
Berent, Iris, Joseph Shimron & Vered Vaknin. 2001. Phonological constraints on
reading: Evidence from the Obligatory Contour Principle. Journal of Memory
and Language 44, 644–665.
Berent, Iris, Vered Vaknin & Joseph Shimron. 2004. Does a theory of language need
a grammar? Evidence from Hebrew root structure. Brain and Language 90,
170–182.
Berent, Iris & Joseph Shimron. 2003. Co-occurrence restrictions on identical conso-
nants in the Hebrew lexicon: Are they due to similarity? Journal of Linguistics
39, 31–55.
Berent, Iris, Colin Wilson, Gary F. Marcus & Douglas K. Bemis. 2012. On the role of
variables in phonology: Remarks on Hayes & Wilson 2008. Linguistic Inquiry
43(1), 97–119.
Berwick, Robert C., Angela D. Friederici, Noam Chomsky & Johan J. Bolhuis. 2013.
Evolution, brain, and the nature of language. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17,
89–98.
Boeckx, Cedric. 2008. Bare Syntax. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boeckx, Cedric. 2013. Merge: Biolinguistic considerations. English Linguistics 30,
463–484.
Bosˇkovic´, Zˇeljko. 2002. On multiple wh-fronting. Linguistic Inquiry 33, 351–383.
Bosˇkovic´, Zˇeljko & Jairo Nunes. 2007. The copy theory of movement: A view from
244 E. Leivada
PF. In Norbert Corver & Jairo Nunes (eds.), The Copy Theory of Movement, 351–
385. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Breheny, Richard & David Adger. 2005. Commentary on ‘exaption and linguistic
explanation’. Lingua 115, 1673–1677.
Brugger, Peter, Theodor Landis & Marianne Regard. 1992. The brain as a random
generator: The relevance of subjective randomization for neuropsychology.
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 14, 84.
Brugger, Peter, Andreas U. Monsch, David P. Salmon & Nelson Butters. 1996a.
Random number generation in dementia of the Alzheimer type: A test of
frontal executive functions. Neuropsychologia 34, 97–103.
Brugger, Peter, Andreas U. Monsch & Shannon A. Johnson. 1996b. Repetitive be-
havior and repetition avoidance: The role of the right hemisphere. Journal of
Psychiatry and Neuroscience 21, 53–56.
Buffat, Ste´phane, Justin Plantier, Corinne Roumes & Jean Lorenceau. 2013. Repeti-
tion blindness for natural images of objects with viewpoint changes. Frontiers
in Psychology 3, 622.
Campanella, Fabio, Serena D’Agostini, Miran Skrap & Tim Shallice. 2010. Naming
manipulable objects: Anatomy of a category specific effect in left temporal
tumours. Neuropsychologia 48, 1583–1597.
Caramazza, Alfonso & Argye E. Hillis. 1991. Lexical organization of nouns and
verbs in the brain. Nature 349, 788–790.
Chanales, Avi J. H., Ashima Oza, Serra E. Favila & Brice A. Kuhl. 2017. Overlap
among spatial memories triggers repulsion of hippocampal representations.
Current Biology 27(15), 2307–2317.
Cheney, Dorothy L. & Robert M. Seyfarth. 1997. Why animals don’t have language.
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge University, March 10–12.
Cheney, Dorothy L. & Robert M. Seyfarth. 2007. Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution
of a Social Mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cheney, Dorothy L. & Robert M. Seyfarth. 2010. Primate communication and hu-
man language: Continuities and discontinuities. In Peter M. Kappeler & Joan
B. Silk (eds.), Mind the Gap: Tracing the Origins of Human Universals, 283–298.
Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Cho, Yang-Je, Sang-Don Han, Sook Keun Song, Byung In Lee & Kyoung Heo. 2009.
Palilalia, echolalia, and echopraxia–palipraxia as ictal manifestations in a pa-
tient with left frontal lobe epilepsy. Epilepsia 50(6), 1616–1619.
Chomsky, Noam. 1967. The formal nature of language. In Eric Lenneberg (auth.),
Biological Foundations of Language, 397–442. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Chomsky, Noam. 2005. Three factors in language design. Linguistic Inquiry 36,
1–22.
Chomsky, Noam. 2007. Approaching UG from below. In Uli Sauerland & Hans-
Martin Ga¨rtner (eds.), Interfaces + Recursion = Language?, 1–29. Berlin: Mou-
ton de Gruyter.
Chomsky, Noam. 2013. Problems of projection. Lingua 130, 33–49.
Cinque, Guglielmo. 1999. Adverbs and Functional Heads: A Cross-Linguistic Perspec-
tive. New York: Oxford University Press.
Clay, Zanna, Jahmaira Archbold & Klaus Zuberbu¨hler. 2015. Functional flexibility
in wild bonobo vocal behaviour. PeerJ 3: e1124.
What’s in (a) Label? 245
Collins, Chris. 2002. Multiple verb movement in ‡Hoan. Linguistic Inquiry 33(1),
1–29.
Collins, Chris. 2016. *NEG NEG. [https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003159].
Corbetta, Maurizio, Gaurav Patel & Gordon L. Shulman. 2008. The reorienting
system of the human brain: from environment to theory of mind. Neuron 58,
306–324.
Corver, Norbert. 2014. Recursing in Dutch. Natural Language & Linguistic Theory 32,
423–457.
Crepaldi, Davide, Chiara Ingignoli, Ruggero Verga, Antonella Contardi, Carlo Se-
menza & Claudio Luzzatti. 2011. On nouns, verbs, lexemes, and lemmas:
Evidence from the spontaneous speech of seven aphasic patients. Aphasiol-
ogy 25(1), 71–92.
Davis, Henry. 2010. A unified analysis of relative clauses in St’a´t’imcets. North-west
Journal of Linguistics 4, 1–43.
de Diego-Balaguer, Ruth, Anna Martinez-Alvarez & Ferran Pons. 2016. Temporal
attention as a scaffold for language development. Frontiers in Psychology 7,
44.
Du, Yuhui, Susanna L. Fryer, Zening Fu, Dongdong Lin, Jing Sui, Jiayu Chen, Eswar
Damaraju, Eva Mennigen, Barbara Stuart, Rachel L. Loewy, Daniel H. Math-
alon & Vince D. Calhoun. 2017. Dynamic functional connectivity impair-
ments in early schizophrenia and clinical high-risk for psychosis. NeuroImage.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.10.022d.
Dubois, Jessica, Cyril Poupon, Bertrand Thirion, Hina Simonnet, Sofya Kulikova,
Franc¸ois Leroy, Lucie Hertz-Pannier & Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz. 2015.
Exploring the early organization and maturation of linguistic pathways in
the human infant brain. Cerebral Cortex 26(5), 2283–2298.
Fa´bregas, Antonio. 2014. Phrasal spell out: an argument from haplology. Linguistic
Analysis 39, 1–2.
Ferrara, Mauro, Francesca Freda, R. Massa & T. J. Carratelli. 2006. Frontal lobe
syndrome or adolescent-onset schizophrenia? A case report. Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica 114 (5), 375–377.
Fioravanti, Mario, Olimpia Carlone, Barbara Vitale, Maria Elena Cinti & Linda
Clare. 2005. A meta-analysis of cognitive deficits in adults with a diagno-
sis of schizophrenia. Neuropsychology Review 15(2), 73–95.
Frisch, Stefan A., Janet B. Pierrehumbert & Michael B. Broe. 2004. Similarity avoid-
ance and the OCP. Natural Language & Linguistic Theory 22, 179–228.
Gallistel, C. R. & Adam Philip King. 2009. Memory and the Computational Brain.
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ghomeshi, Jila, Ray Jackendoff, Nicole Rosen & Kevin Russell. 2004. Contrastive
focus reduplication in English (the salad-salad paper). Natural Language &
Linguistic Theory 22, 307–357.
Gil, David. 2009. How much grammar does it take to sail a boat? In Geoffrey
Sampson, David Gil & Peter Trudgill (eds.), Language Complexity as an Evolv-
ing Variable, 19–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Geschwind, Norman. 1974. Selected Papers on Language and the Brain. Dordrecht:
Reidel.
246 E. Leivada
Gopnik, Myrna. 1990. Feature blindness: A case study. Language Acquisition 1(2),
139–164.
Goucha, Toma´s, Emiliano Zaccarella & Angela D. Friederici. 2017. A revival of the
Homo loquens as a builder of labeled structures: neurocognitive considera-
tions. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.01.
036.
Green, Steven & Peter Marler. 1979. The analysis of animal communication. In
Peter Marler & J. G. Vandenbergh (eds.), Handbook of Behavioral Neurobiology.
Volume 3, Social Behavior and Communication, 73–158. New York & London:
Plenum Press.
Grimshaw, Jane. 1991. Extended Projection. Ms, Brandeis University.
Grimshaw, Jane. 1997. The best clitic: Constraint conflict in morphosyntax. In
Liliane Haegeman (ed.), Elements of Grammar, 169–196. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Grimshaw, Jane 2005. Extended Projection. In Jane Grimshaw (ed.), Words and
Structure, 1–69. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Grohmann, Kleanthes K. 2000. Prolific peripheries: A radical view from the left.
College Park, MD: University of Maryland dissertation.
Grohmann, Kleanthes K. 2003. Prolific Domains: On the Anti-Locality of Movement
Dependencies. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Hauser, Marc D., Noam Chomsky & W. Tecumseh Fitch. 2002. The faculty of lan-
guage: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298, 1569–1579.
Hayashi, Shuichi & Masatoshi Takeichi. 2015. Emerging roles of protocadherins:
from self-avoidance to enhancement of motility. Journal of Cell Science 128,
1455–1464.
Herna´ndez, Mireia, Albert Costa, Nu´ria Sebastia´n-Galle´s, Montserrat Juncadella &
Ramo´n Ren˜e´. 2007. The organisation of nouns and verbs in bilingual speak-
ers: A case of bilingual grammatical category-specific deficit. Journal of Neu-
rolinguistics 20, 285–305.
Hill, Kathryn, Nicolas Bolo, Suraj Sarvode Mothi, Paulo Lizano, Synthia Guimond,
Neeraj Tandon, Elena Molokotos & Matcheri Keshavan. 2017. Subcortical
surface shape in youth at familial high risk for schizophrenia. Psychiatry Re-
search Neuroimaging 267, 36–44.
Hinzen, Wolfram & Michelle Sheehan. 2013. The Philosophy of Universal Grammar.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirabayashi Takahiro & Takeshi Yagi. 2014. Protocadherins in neurological dis-
eases. In Vladimir Berezin & Peter S. Walmod (eds.), Cell Adhesion Molecules.
Advances in Neurobiology, vol 8, 293–314. New York: Springer.
Hiraiwa, Ken. 2010. The Syntactic OCP. In Yukio Otsu (ed.) The Proceedings of the
11th Tokyo Conference on Psycholinguistics, 35–56. Hituzi: Tokyo.
Hockett, Charles F. 1960. The origin of speech. Scientific American 203, 88–96.
Hornstein, Norbert. 2009. A Theory of Syntax: Minimal Operations and Universal
Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hornstein, Norbert & Jairo Nunes. 2008. Adjunction, labeling, and bare phrase
structure. Biolinguistics 2, 57–86.
Hornstein, Norbert & Paul Pietroski. 2009. Basic operations: Minimal syntax-
semantics. Catalan Journal of Linguistics 8, 113–139.
What’s in (a) Label? 247
Kambanaros, Maria. 2008. The trouble with nouns and verbs in Greek fluent apha-
sia. Journal of Communication Disorders 41, 1–19.
Kambanaros, Maria. 2014. Context effects on verb production in specific language
impairment (SLI): confrontation naming versus connected speech. Clinical
Linguistics & Phonetics 28, 826–843.
Kambanaros, Maria & Kleanthes K. Grohmann. 2015. Grammatical class effects
across impaired child and adult populations. Frontiers in Psychology 6, 1670.
Kammer, Thomas, Fabian Saleh, Godehard Oepen, Theo Manschreck, Soraya Seyy-
edi, Nancy Kanwisher, Chris Furmanski & Manfred Spitzer. 1998. Repetition
blindness in schizophrenic patients. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clini-
cal Neuroscience 248, 136–140.
Kanwisher, Nancy. 1987. Repetition blindness: Type recognition without token
individuation. Cognition 27, 117–143.
Kanwisher, Nancy, Jon Driver & Liana Machado. 1995. Spatial repetition blindness
is modulated by selective attention to color or shape. Cognitive Psychology 29,
303–337.
Kaplan, Gisela. 2008. Alarm calls and referentiality in Australian magpies: between
midbrain and forebrain, can a case be made for complex cognition? Brain
Research Bulletin 76(3), 253–263.
King, Stephanie L. & Vincent M. Janik. 2013. Bottlenose dolphins can use learned
vocal labels to address each other. PNAS 110, 13216–13221.
Kremers, Nico A. W., Lorena Deuker, Thorsten A. Kranz, Carina Oehrn, Juergen
Fell & Nikolai Axmacher. 2014. Hippocampal control of repetition effects for
associative stimuli. Hippocampus 24(7), 892–902
Laiacona, Marcella & Alfonso Caramazza. 2004. The noun/verb dissociation in
language production: varieties of causes. Cognitive Neuropsychology 21, 103–
123.
Laka, Itziar. 2013. Jabberwocky, or the poetry of function words. Mapping Ig-
norance. [https://mappingignorance.org/2013/12/13/jabberwocky-or-the-
poetry-of-function-words/]
Lefebvre, Julie L., Dimitar Kostadinov, Weisheng V. Chen, Tom Maniatis & Joshua
R. Sanes. 2012. Protocadherins mediate dendritic self-avoidance in the mam-
malian nervous system. Nature 488, 517–521.
Leivada, Evelina. 2015. X-within-X structures and the nature of categories. Biolin-
guistics 9, 50–73.
Lenneberg, Eric H. 1967. Biological Foundations of Language. New York: John Wiley
& Sons.
Lenneberg, Eric H. 1975. The concept of language differentiation. In Eric H. Lenne-
berg & Elizabeth Lenneberg (eds.), Foundations of Language Development. A
Multidisciplinary Approach, Volume 1, 17–33. New York: Academic Press.
Levelt, Willem. 1989. Speaking. From Intention to Articulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Levin, Netta, Tamir Ben-Hur, Iftah Biran & Eli Wertman. 2005. Category specific
dysnomia after thalamic infarction: a case-control study. Neuropsychologia
43(9), 1385–1390.
Marantz, Alec. 1997. No escape from syntax: Don’t try morphological analysis in
the privacy of your own lexicon. In Alexis Dimitriadis, Laura Siegel, Clarissa
248 E. Leivada
Surek-Clark & Alexander Williams (eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Penn
Linguistics Colloquium, 201–225. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylva-
nia.
Marcus, Gary F., Sujith Vijayan, Shoba Bandi Rao & Peter M. Vishton. 1999. Rule
learning by seven-month-old infants. Science 283, 77–80.
Mascarenhas, Salvador. 2007. Complementizer doubling in European Portu-guese.
Ms., Amsterdam, ILLC.
Meir, Irit, Wendy Sandler, Carol Padden & Mark Aronoff. 2010. Emerging sign
languages. In Marc Marschark & Patricia Elizabeth Spencer (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Deaf Studies, Language, and Education, vol. 2, 267-280. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Moseley, Rachel L. & Friedemann Pulvermu¨ller. 2014. Nouns, verbs, objects, ac-
tions, and abstractions: Local fMRI activity indexes semantics, not lexical
categories. Brain and Language 132, 28–42.
Murphy, Elliot. 2015a. Labels, cognomes, and cyclic computation: an ethological
perspective. Frontiers in Psychology 6, 715.
Murphy, Elliot. 2015b. The brain dynamics of linguistic computation. Frontiers in
Psychology 6, 1515.
Narita, Hiroki. 2011. Phasing in Full Interpretation. Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University.
Nevins, Andrew. 2010. Two case studies in phonological universals: A view from
artificial grammars. Biolinguistics 4, 218–233.
Nevins, Andrew. 2012. Haplological dissimilation at distinct stages of exponence.
In Jochen Trommer (ed.), The Morphology and Phonology of Exponence, 84–116.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nevins, Andrew & Bert Vaux. 2003. Metalinguistic, Shmetalinguistic: The Phonol-
ogy of Shm-Reduplication. Proceedings of CLS 39, 702–721.
Odden, David. 1986. On the role of the Obligatory Contour Principle in phonolog-
ical theory. Language 62, 353-383.
Okanoya, Kazuo. 2012. Behavioural factors governing song complexity in Ben-
galese finches. International Journal of Comparative Psychology 25, 44–59.
Okanoya, Kazuo. 2015. Evolution of song complexity in Bengalese finches could
mirror the emergence of human language. Journal of Ornithology 156, 65–72.
Ota, Mitsuhiko & Barbora Skarabela. 2016. Reduplicated words are easier to learn.
Language Learning and Development 12, 380–397.
Ota, Mitsuhiko & Barbora Skarabela. 2017. Reduplication facilitates early word
segmentation. Journal of Child Language. doi:10.1017/S0305000916000660.
Østby, Ylva, Christian K. Tamnes, Anders M. Fjell, Lars T. Westlye, Paulina Due-
Tønnessen & Kristine B. Walhovd. 2009. Heterogeneity in subcortical brain
development: a structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging study of brain mat-
uration from 8 to 30 Years. Journal of Neuroscience 29, 11772–11782.
Panagiotidis, Phoevos. 2011. Categorial features and categorizers. The Linguistic
Review 28, 365–386.
Panagiotidis, Phoevos. 2015. Categorial Features. A Generative Theory of Word Class
Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Panagiotidis, Phoevos & Kleanthes K. Grohmann. 2009. Mixed projections: Cate-
gorial switches and prolific domains. Linguistic Analysis 35, 141–161.
What’s in (a) Label? 249
Perlmutter, David M. 1971. Deep and Surface Structure Constraints in Syntax. New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Pesetsky, David. 1995. Zero Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pesetsky, David & Esther Torrego. 2004. Tense, case and the nature of syntactic
categories. In Jacqueline Gue´ron & Jacqueline Lecarme (eds.), The Syntax of
Time, 495–537. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Peterson Bradley S., HuiMahn A. Choi, Xuejun Hao, Jose A. Amat, Hongtu Zhu,
Ronald Whiteman, Jun Liu, Dongrong Xu & Ravi Bansal. 2007. Morpho-
logic features of the amygdala and hippocampus in children and adults with
Tourette syndrome. Archives of General Psychiatry 64, 1281–1291.
Petitto, Laura-Ann. 2005. How the brain begets language. In James McGilvray
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky, 84–101. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Posner, Michael I. & Yoav Cohen. 1984. Components of visual orienting. Attention
and Performance 32, 531–556.
Potts, Christopher. 2007. The expressive dimension. Theoretical Linguistics 33, 165–
197.
Premack, David. 1971. Language in chimpanzee? Science 172(3985), 808–822.
Ramı´rez Ferna´ndez, Javier. 2015. Locality in language and locality in brain oscilla-
tory structures. Biolinguistics 9, 74–95.
Richards, Norvin. 2006. A distinctness condition on linearization. Ms., MIT.
Richards, Norvin. 2010. Uttering Trees. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Riede, Tobias & Klaus Zuberbu¨hler. 2003. The relationship between acoustic struc-
ture and semantic information in Diana monkey alarm vocalization. Journal
of the Acoustical Society of America 114, 1132–1142.
van Riemsdijk, Henk. 1998. Categorial feature magnetism: The endocentricity and
distribution of projections. Journal of Comparative Germanic Languages 2, 1–48.
van Riemsdijk, Henk. 2008. Identity avoidance: OCP effects in Swiss relatives.
In Robert Freidin, Carlos P. Otero & Maria Luisa Zubizarreta (eds.), Foun-
dational Issues in Linguistic Theory: Essays in Honor of Jean-Roger Vergnaud, 227–
250. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rizzi, Luigi. 1997. The fine structure of the left periphery. In Liliane Haegeman
(ed.), Elements of Grammar: Handbook in Generative Syntax, 281–337. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer.
Ross, John R. 1972. The category squish: Endstation Hauptwort. Chicago Linguistic
Society 8, 316-328.
Samuels, Bridget. 2014. On the biological origins of linguistic identity. In Kuniya
Nasukawa & Henk van Riemsdijk (eds.), Identity Relations in Grammar, 341–
364. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Samuels, Bridget. 2015. Biolinguistics in phonology: a prospectus. Phonological
Studies 18, 161–171.
Sandler, Wendy, Irit Meir, Svetlana Dachkovsky, Carol Padden & Mark Aronoff.
2011. The emergence of complexity in prosody and syntax. Lingua 121, 2014–
2033.
Shannon, Claude E. 1948. A mathematical theory of communication. The Bell Sys-
tem Technical Journal 27, 379–423.
Soderstrom, Melanie, Kenneth Wexler & Peter W. Jusczyk. 2002. English-learning
250 E. Leivada
toddlers’ sensitivity to agreement morphology in receptive grammar. In Bar-
bora Skarabela, Sarah Fish & Anna H.-J. Do (eds.), Proceedings of the 26th An-
nual Boston University Conference on Language Development, vol. 2, 643–652.
Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press.
Steuber, Lucas Carl. 2011. Disordered Thought, Disordered Language: A corpus-
based description of the speech of individuals undergoing treatment for
schizophrenia. MA thesis, Portland State University.
Tkachman, Oksana & Wendy Sandler. 2013. The noun-verb distinction in two
young sign languages. Gesture 13, 253–286.
Towse, John N. 1998. On random generation and the central executive of working
memory. British Journal of Psychology 89, 77–101.
Towse, John N. & Derek Neil. 1998. Analyzing human random generation be-
havior: A review of methods used and a computer program for describing
performance. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 30(4),583–
591.
Towse, John Nicholas, Andrea Sarah Towse, Satoru Saito, Yukio Maehara & Akira
Miyake. 2016. Joint cognition: Thought contagion and the consequences of
cooperation when sharing the task of random sequence generation. PLoS
ONE 11(3), e0151306.
Tsimpli, Ianthi-Maria. 2013. (Evidence for) the language instinct. In Cedric Boeckx
& Kleanthes K. Grohmann (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Biolinguistics, 49–
68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tyrone, Martha E. & Bencie Woll. 2008. Palilalia in sign language. Neurology 70,
155–156.
Vetter, Petra, Grace Edwards & Lars Muckli. 2013. Transfer of predictive signals
across saccades. Frontiers in Psychology 3, 176.
de Waal, Frans & Pier Francesco Ferrari. 2010. Towards a bottom-up perspective
on animal and human cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4(5), 201–207.
Walter, Mary Ann. 2007. Repetition avoidance in human language. Cambridge,
MA: MIT dissertation.
Washabaugh, William. 1986. Five Fingers for Survival: Deaf Sign Language in the
Caribbean. Ann Arbor, MI: Karoma Press.
Watson, Stuart K., Simon W. Townsend, Anne M. Schel, Claudia Wilke, Emma K.
Wallace, Leveda Cheng, Victoria West & Katie E. Slocombe. 2015. Vocal learn-
ing in the functionally referential food grunts of chimpanzees. Current Biology
25, 1–5.
Yip, Moira. 1988. The Obligatory Contour Principle and phonological rules: A loss
of identity. Linguistic Inquiry 19, 65–100.
Zuberbu¨hler, Klaus. 2010. Referential labelling in Diana monkeys. Animal Be-
haviour 59, 917–927.
Evelina Leivada
UiT-The Arctic University of Norway
Department of Language and Culture
Hansine Hansens veg 14
9037 Tromsø
Norway
evelina.leivada@uit.no
